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Abstract—The emergence of new low power IoT networks in 
which leaf nodes have native IPv6 connectivity and the grown 
awareness for data protection of IoT devices require leaf nodes to 
provide a higher level of security, similar to the level of a standard 
computer system. Especially in terms of energy consumption and 
device cost, the intensive cryptographic operations of well-known 
computer security algorithms are a big challenge for resource 
constrained devices. To face these challenges, semiconductor 
vendors have recently introduced new dedicated hardware, so 
called secure elements. These devices provide hardware 
accelerated support for cryptographic operations and tamper 
proof memory for the secure storage of cryptographically sensitive 
material. Moreover, they employ specific techniques against so-
called side channel attacks. The paper describes and specifies 
different classes of secure elements and discusses their 
opportunities and challenges. Furthermore, the paper provides 
multiple detailed examples how secure elements can be used for 
different applications. Finally, this paper briefly presents general 
measurement results from a performed evaluation with four 
selected secure elements from different vendors. A more complete 
report about the performed evaluation will be presented in a 
following paper. The purpose of this paper is to introduce the 
concept of secure elements and provide a generic overview of their 
features, serving as starting point to work with secure elements.  
Keywords—IoT security, secure elements, hardware 
cryptography, authentication, tamper proof memory, side channel 
protection, resource constrained devices, Thread network,    
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Newly introduced IoT networks such as Thread [1], which 
is based on the 802.15.4 standard [2], provide native Internet 
Protocol version 6 (IPv6) connectivity down to the resource 
constrained device. This paper refers to resource constrained 
devices as leaf nodes and understands them as a battery 
powered electronic device which is controlled by a 
microcontroller unit (MCU). The native IPv6 connectivity 
offers many opportunities such as service discovery, end-to-end 
security and transparent routing down to the leaf node. Due to 
the transparent routing, there is also no need for a complex and 
energy consuming gateway. However, due to the missing 
gateway and straightforward accessibility, the leaf node is 
exposed to attacks from the outside world. Furthermore, the leaf 
node can be directly connected to the IT infrastructure and 
therefore may serve as a simple entry point for attackers. As a 
result, the required security level for a leaf node is much higher 
in such IoT networks. The challenge is to leverage the elaborate, 
well-known computer security, which otherwise would be 
provided by a gateway, to the resource constrained device 
without dramatically increasing the power consumption nor the 
cost with regard to memory sizes and required processor 
performance.  
To face these challenges, semiconductor vendors have 
recently introduced dedicated hardware devices, so called 
secure elements. Secure elements execute cryptographic 
operations in hardware, which allows for fast and energy 
efficient execution of cryptographic algorithms. Furthermore, 
secure elements provide tamper proof memory for secure 
storage of cryptographic material. These features allow the leaf 
node to provide a high security level and to be an authentic and 
secure member of an IT infrastructure. 
This paper is structured accordingly. First, we introduce the 
concept of secure elements by providing a categorization for 
secure elements and a detailed description how secure elements 
are used. In chapter three and four, we show opportunities as 
well as challenges of secure elements. Subsequently, we discuss 
energy and execution time measurements with four different 
secure elements we performed. The paper closes with 
appropriate conclusions. 
II. SECURE ELEMENTS 
Secure elements emerged from the field of security 
controllers used in smart / banking card applications. These 
security controllers offer communication interfaces compliant 
to the ISO7618 [3] standard and provide an operating system 
(OS) for their specific application. The application on the 
security controllers are typically written by external security 
experts. As awareness for security issues in the IoT industry 
rises, semiconductor vendors strive to offer an easy to use, out-
of-the-box solution with already integrated firmware 
specifically for IoT applications. Furthermore, these new secure 
elements offer serial communication interfaces to communicate 
with a main MCU on the IoT device. This paper focuses on 
these new secure elements for IoT applications.  
 
Fig. 1 Secure element architecture 
Fig. 1 shows a generic secure element architecture. Secure 
elements support the MCU by executing standard cryptographic 
algorithms, e.g. Advance Encryption Standard (AES) [4] or 
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) [5] operations, in 
hardware. Typically, all secure elements support elliptic curve 
cryptography (ECC) [6] on the NIST p-256 curve. The 
foundation of strong cryptography is a reliable entropy source. 
To provide such a reliable entropy source, secure elements are 
equipped with a certified true random number generator 
(TRNG). Furthermore, secure elements provide tamper proof 
memory to store cryptographic material, such as private keys, 
long living session keys or public-key certificates which serve 
as root of trust.  
Additionally, secure elements provide up to 4 kBytes of 
general purpose memory to securely store e.g. application data. 
Furthermore, secure elements provide monotonic counters. 
These counters can only be increased and never be reset. They 
may be used in multiple ways, e.g. to restrict the use of certain 
keys to only a certain number of times or to prevent replay 
attacks. Secure elements also have a unique device number, 
which may be used to authenticate the secure element to the 
MCU, allowing to detect unauthorized substitution of the secure 
element.  
Communication between the secure element and its host 
MCU is typically realized over an I2C interface with max. data 
rates up to 1 Mbit/s. Table 1 in the appendix, summarizes 
common secure element features. However, there are secure 
elements that additionally to the I2C offer a single-wire 
interface (SWI) or a serial peripheral interface (SPI). 
Secure elements may be used in applications for various 
purposes such as authentication, secure storage and for 
cryptographic operations support. Applications include 
protection of intellectual property, device authentication, secure 
end-to-end channel establishment and many more.  
A. Categories of secure elements 
Yet not all secure elements have the same range of features 
nor do they target the same application use cases. Essentially, 
they can be divided into two categories.  
First, there is the category of supporting secure elements. 
These secure elements are intended to support the software 
execution of cryptographic operations by a library such as 
mbedTLS [7], running on a host MCU. Supporting secure 
elements provide secure storage for sensitive material and 
hardware acceleration for a variety of cryptographic operations. 
This increases the leaf nodes security by physically isolating 
private keys and other secrets as well as by significantly 
reducing the energy consumption through the hardware 
accelerated execution. If a cryptographic software is needed on 
the MCU, e.g. because special cryptographic algorithms like the 
JPAKE [8] cipher suite are used, supporting secure elements 
are an appropriate choice.  
The second category are standalone secure elements. These 
secure elements are capable to autonomously handle a security 
layer. To achieve this, they provide a complete set of 
cryptographic operations with additional control features to 
establish and maintain a secure and authentic connection 
without software support on the host MCU. Therefore, they 
have to be able to handle messages for a (Datagram) Transport 
Layer Security (D)TLS [9] session. Yet, standalone secure 
elements are also able to support a host MCU that uses a 
cryptographic software, like the supporting secure elements. 
For both categories of secure elements, one can say that, if 
all the cryptographic operations are executed on a secure 
element, the overall security of an IoT device can be enhanced, 
because all the sensitive material for the cryptographic 
operations always remains within the tamper proof memory of 
the secure element. 
B. Opportunities of secure elements 
A typical IoT device is equipped with an MCU that has 
constrained processing power. Therefore, elaborate 
cryptographic operations, e.g. sign and verify operations of the 
elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) [10], have 
long execution times. This results in a high energy 
consumption. Since IoT devices are mostly battery powered, 
the high energy consumption therefore significantly reduces the 
battery lifetime by providing hardware acceleration for 
cryptographic operations. Secure elements enable resource 
constrained devices to execute elaborate cryptographic 
algorithms fast and energy efficient. Allowing even a battery-
powered device to use well-known computer security 
algorithms.  
Another issue with MCUs is that their memory is accessible, 
which means that it can be read or even manipulated with a 
debugger. This exposes sensitive material and makes stored 
data not reliable. Secure elements on the other hand provide 
secure and authentic data storage. Secure, due to the tamper 
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proof memory which protects the stored data against physical 
attacks, such as imaging or fault injection [11] and authentic 
because memory access on the secure element requires 
authentication by its host MCU before data can be read or 
altered. Additionally, there is also the issue that MCUs mostly 
offer only a limited amount of memory size. Due to this, MCUs 
may not be able to store multiple x509 certificates [12], since 
these certificates can be well up to 1 kBytes or even bigger. 
Secure elements provide storage capacity for multiple x509 
certificates and further capabilities regarding certificates, such 
as the creation of certificate signing requests (CSR) [13]. 
Another key feature is the protection of private keys. It is 
impossible to extract any private key from a secure element, 
neither by software nor physically. The private key may be 
either generated inside the secure element itself or inserted in a 
secure environment at a manufacturer site.  
IoT devices are typically physically accessible for an 
attacker, which exposes them to hardware attacks such as 
manipulation, brute force or side channel attacks. With a brute 
force attack, an adversary systematically tests all possible keys 
hoping to find the correct one. A side channel attack is an attack 
where an attacker tries to gain sensitive information by 
observing and analyzing properties of an IoT device, e.g. power 
consumption, execution time or electromagnetic leakage. 
Secure elements provide specific protection measures, such as 
secure boot, security monitoring or constant-time-
implementation, to prevent hardware attacks.  
C. Challenges of secure elements 
Although, secure elements have many positive features, 
there are also challenges in using secure elements. The 
communication between the MCU and the secure element over 
I2C poses a potential security threat. Since an attacker may 
probe this interface, he may be able to read content and to 
execute replay or fault injection attacks. However, there are 
multiple ways to secure the I2C interface. One way is by 
encrypting or obfuscating the content on the I2C lines. 
Therefore, a symmetric secret or asymmetric keys need to be 
inserted into the secure element and the MCU. However, this 
method has a major drawback, since the secret or key to decrypt 
messages is stored on the accessible memory of the MCU. 
Furthermore, not all secure elements offer the feature to 
obfuscate the I2C communication.  The second method is to 
protect the interface by actively shielding the I2C lines. To 
achieve this, the lines must be placed between two reference 
layers (VCC or GND) of the PCB. This may result in higher 
design effort and cost but provides an effective protection 
against probing. However, most important is that the developer 
is aware of the problem and knows exactly which content may 
be transferred in plain text across the I2C interface and 
implements according protection measures. The optimal 
solution is to never exchange sensitive material between the 
MCU and the secure element.  
Another issue with secure elements is more an 
administrative one. Currently, if one would like to get detailed 
information about a secure element a non-disclosure agreement 
(NDA) between the customer and the secure element vendor 
has to be in place. Furthermore, the development effort and 
expertise required to integrate the individual secure element is 
extremely high. In this study, the integration of all four secure 
elements required thorough support from the field application 
engineers of the respective vendors for a successful integration 
into an existing application. These points pose major obstacles 
to widely adopt and deploy secure elements in IoT devices. 
Therefore, the authors of this paper see a strong need for an 
open information exchange and harmonization of the interfaces. 
III. USAGE OF SECURE ELEMENTS 
Secure elements contribute to applications in many different 
ways e.g. secure boot, secure messaging or (D)TLS. These three 
selected examples are presented in detail in the following 
section.  
A. Example 1: Secure boot with secure elements 
Secure boot is defined as a boot sequence in which the 
MCU, secure element pair is authenticated. This sequence is 
designed to detect and prevent manipulations either on the 
MCU or the secure element, e.g. to prevent the unauthorized 
execution of software on the MCU or unauthorized usage of 
cryptographic material stored on the secure element. Fig. 2 
illustrates how a secure boot process may be executed.  
 
Fig. 2 Secure boot process 
This process is executed during the boot process of an 
MCU. The secure boot process is initiated with the MCU 
hashing the Application Image (AI). The resulting digest is sent 
to the secure element. Furthermore, the AI digest combined 
with a symmetric secret and a random number, are hashed 
creating the message authentication code (MAC). The MAC as 
well as the random number are sent to the secure element. The 
secure element reproduces the MAC using the AI digest and 
random number received from the MCU as well as the 
symmetric secret stored on the secure element. This reproduced 
MAC is then compared with the MAC received from the MCU. 
If the two MACs coincide, the MCU, secure element pair is 
mutually authenticated. If the verification fails e.g. due to 
unauthorized exchange of the MCU, the secure element no 
longer allows the MCU to use stored keys and denies access to 
stored data. On the other hand, if the secure element has been 
exchanged, the MCU must not execute the application image 
due the secure boot failure.  
To shorten the secure boot process, the AI digest may be 
stored on the secure element after the first successful boot 
process. This has also the advantage that an attacker is not able 
to get the AI digest by probing the I2C lines and allows for the 
detection of unauthorized changes in the application image. The 
random number is used to prevent replay attacks and may be 
generated either on the MCU or the secure element. The 
symmetric secret stored on both the MCU and the secure 
element obfuscates the process for an attacker and makes it 
impossible to guess the MAC even if an attacker is in 
possession of the AI digest and the random number. The secret 
is unique to each leaf node device and should be inserted at the 
manufacturer site, in a secure environment, e.g. during 
production testing. Additionally, even if an attacker finds the 
secret on the accessible memory of the MCU, only a single leaf 
node device is compromised. This secure boot could also be 
executed with asymmetric keys, by signing the AI digest on the 
MCU and verifying the signature with a protected public key 
on the secure element. However, the cryptographic algorithms 
needed for the asymmetric version may exceed the processor 
capacity of the MCU bootloader. [14] 
B. Example 2: Secure messaging with secure elements 
One of the key features of a secure element is the protection 
of private keys. Key pairs (private / public key) may be 
generated inside the secure element. The stored key pair can be 
used to en- / decrypt messages for the MCU.  
 
Fig. 3 Generation of an ECC public/private key pair on a secure element 
followed by an exchange of public keys between the leaf node and a cloud  
Fig. 3 shows the key generation on a secure element 
followed by an exchange of public keys between a leaf node 
and a cloud server. A key point is, that the private key always 
remains on the secure element whereas the public key is sent to 
the cloud server. The cloud stores the public key of the leaf node 
and in exchange sends its public key to the leaf node, where the 
MCU forwards the public key to the secure element for storage.  
Fig. 4 shows how the leaf node may use the previously 
exchanged keys, to en- / decrypt messages. As an example, the 
MCU first collects data from a sensor and generates the 
message. The message is then handed to the secure element, 
which encrypts the message using the previously stored public 
key of the cloud server. The encrypted message is then sent to 
the cloud. The cloud processes the message and sends an 
encrypted response to the leaf node. The MCU forwards this 
response to the secure element which uses its internally 
generated private key to decrypt it. The response is transferred 
to the MCU, which acts accordingly. 
 
Fig. 4 Encrypted exchange of messages between leaf node and cloud  
C. Example 3: DTLS session with secure elements 
New IoT networks, such as Thread, provide IPv6 all the way 
down to the resource constrained device. The new IP 
connectivity on the leaf node offers the opportunity to establish 
secure end-to-end channels between a leaf node and a server, 
shown in Fig. 5. 
 
Fig. 5 Thread network with native IPv6 connectivity on the leaf node 
A standard way to establish an authentic secure channel is 
by using the (D)TLS protocol. To establish a (D)TLS session a 
handshake needs to be executed first. During this process, the 
leaf node and the server present their respective public-key 
certificates to authenticate themselves and then use asymmetric 
keys to derive a shared secret. This shared secret is used as a 
symmetric key to en- / decrypt messages between the leaf node 
and the server. To authenticate the server to the leaf node, the 
leaf node requires the public-key certificate of the server’s 
certificate authority (CA). This previously obtained and stored 
certificate allows to verify the server certificate presented 
during the handshake. The CA public-key certificate is the root 
of trust and therefore must be protected against manipulation. 
Accordingly, the public-key certificate should be stored in the 
secured memory of the secure element. Furthermore, the secure 
element can accelerate the handshake execution and therefore 
reduce energy consumption.  
For both of the before discussed usage examples, secure 
boot and secure messaging, it does not matter whether a 
supporting or a standalone secure element is used. This changes 
for a (D)TLS handshake. Supporting secure elements only 
support the cryptographic software, in executing the handshake 
by executing cryptographic operations and providing trusted 
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memory storage. On the other hand, standalone secure elements 
are able to autonomously handle the handshake messages with 
no further support of the MCU.  
 
Fig. 6 DTLS handshake using a supporting secure element 
Fig. 6 shows a DTLS handshake executed with the support 
of a supporting secure element. The MCU uses the supporting 
secure element to outsource specific cryptographic operations, 
e.g. ECDSA sign and verify ECDH calculation of the shared 
secret or en- / decryption with AES. This allows for faster 
execution of the handshake and increases the overall security 
since sensitive material such as the shared secret and the derived 
keys remain on the secure storage of the secure element. After 
the handshake is successfully executed, the messaging process 
is the same as in the secure messaging example. The difference 
is that with a (D)TLS session in place, the communication is not 
just encrypted but also authentic. This means, the leaf node 
knows to whom it is talking, whereas in the key exchange 
example it has not been able to verify that the cloud server is 
indeed who it claims to be.  
Fig. 7 shows a DTLS handshake with a standalone secure 
element. These secure elements are able to autonomously 
handle the handshake process. The MCU only sends the 
messages from the secure element to the cloud and forwards the 
received messages to the secure element. By executing the 
DTLS handshake on the secure element it-self, all sensitive data 
is stored on the secure element alone. In addition, the secure 
element accelerates the execution of the handshake.  
When selecting a secure element for a specific application 
that involves (D)TLS sessions, some important considerations 
regarding secure elements have to be made. First, standalone 
secure elements typically only support a single specific cipher 
suite. Cipher suites are defined in Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF) [15]  standards and are used to determine the used 
algorithms for the key exchange, signature, verification and 
encryption.  
 
Fig. 7 DTLS handshake using a standalone secure element 
For example, the cipher suite 
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES128_CCM_8 [16] defines 
that ECDH ephemeral key exchange is used as well as ECDSA 
for signing and verification. Finally, en- / decryption is done 
using AES128 in the Counter CBC-MAC modus. Another 
important aspect is the number of parallel sessions that need to 
be established and maintained. There are secure elements, 
which support up to four parallel sessions. 
IV. EVALUATION OF SECURE ELEMENTS 
As part of a project at the Institute of Embedded System a 
detailed evaluation of four secure elements from four different 
vendors has been performed. The evaluation features detailed 
power measurements for two self-designed test cases with all 
four secure elements. The measurements serve to uncover the 
properties and familiarize with the handling of the individual 
secure elements. As a final report of the evaluation a paper has 
been planned. Unfortunately, one vendor is currently 
preventing the publication based on the NDA that protects the 
information about his secure element gained during the 
evaluation. Therefore, the measurement results of the 
evaluation are discussed only in general in this paper. As soon 
as the legal issues will be resolved, a paper will follow, 
discussing the measurement results in detail.  
A. Performed measurements 
The evaluation involved four secure elements, two from the 
category of the supporting secure elements and two standalone 
secure elements. The supporting secure elements are the 
ATECC608A [17] from Microchip and the A71CH [18] from 
NXP. The standalone secure elements are the TO136 [19] from 
Trusted Objects and the OPTIGATM Trust X [20] from Infineon. 
To provide a comparable environment for the measurements a 
printed circuit board (PCB) with all four secure elements on it 
has been designed, shown in Fig. 8.  
 
Fig. 8 Leaf node with four different secure elements 
As host MCU, a NRF52840 [21] from Nordic 
Semiconductors is used. For the evaluation, two test cases have 
been defined. The first one focuses on the execution of five 
standard cryptographic operations allowing for a comparison 
between the different secure elements. The following five 
operations are executed:   
 Generation of a random number 
 Generation of an elliptic curve key pair 
 Calculation of a SHA256 hash 
 Calculation of an ECDSA signature 
 Verification of the signature 
The second test case focuses on a real-world application 
case. In this test case, the leaf node executes a DTLS handshake 
with a server and makes a CoAPs [22] GET request to the 
server. The secure elements support the MCU in the execution 
of the handshake, as described in the chapter III.C.  
As a reference measurement, the test case has been executed 
with the cryptographic software mbedTLS. Fig. 9 shows the 
result of this reference measurement. The DTLS handshake 
executed only in software needs about 4 s and 67’209 nWh. The 
measurement results of the test case with the support of secure 
elements show that both execution time and energy 
consumption can be significantly reduced.  
 
Fig. 9 Power measurement of a DTLS handshake executed with mbedTLS (no 
secure element) 
B. Measurement results 
The measurements results show that there are significant 
differences between the secure elements. The comparisons 
between the secure elements in the first test case have revealed 
that there are secure elements, which execute an ECDSA 
operation in about 60 ms while others need up to 1 s. Even 
though, the fast secure elements tend to have higher current 
consumption, due to the fast execution the overall energy 
consumption is significantly smaller than with the slow secure 
elements. The same can be applied for the real-world 
application test case, where the fast secure elements were able 
to not only halve the execution time of the handshake but also 
reduce the required energy by a factor 5 compared to the 
reference measurement with mbedTLS (using no secure 
element). As a result, using a secure element the DTLS 
handshake could be executed in about 2 s and only required 
about 15’000 nWh. Furthermore, the measurements show that 
secure elements have reasonably small average currents, in a 
range from 3 – 10 mA. Also, the sleep currents are low, 
typically about 50 µA or even 0 µA for one specific secure 
element.  
V. KEY FINDINGS 
Working with secure elements has shown their great 
potential for resource constrained IoT devices. With the 
dedicated hardware acceleration, cryptographic operations can 
be executed faster and may save the leaf node energy and 
therefore extend the battery lifetime. The tamper proof memory 
combined with the access authentication provides a trustworthy 
storage opportunity where sensitive data can be stored. This 
allows the leaf node to become an authentic and trusted entity 
of a network. The performed evaluation has revealed major 
differences regarding execution time and energy consumption 
between the four selected secure elements. This variety offers 
the opportunity to use secure elements for many different 
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applications. However, the evaluation has also shown that a lot 
of effort has to be invested to integrate secure elements into an 
application. This required effort poses a major obstacle to use 
secure elements on IoT devices. Furthermore, the requirement 
for an NDA before any detailed information is exchanged 
between the costumer and the vendor raises the bar to use secure 
elements. However, first impulses into a more open information 
exchange have already been observed. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper introduces the concept of secure elements and 
provides a general description of their features on a basic level. 
Furthermore, the paper defines two categories for secure 
elements. The presented usage examples illustrate how secure 
elements can be used in real-world applications. Although, for 
legal reasons the made evaluation of four selected secure 
elements is not yet ready to be published, this paper presents 
first key learnings from the evaluation. This paper may be seen 
as the introduction to a following paper describing the 
performed evaluation and the selected secure elements in detail.  
VII. APPENDIX  
The following table lists a set of common secure elements 
features and gives a short description.   
TABLE 1 SET OF COMMON SECURE ELEMENT FEATURES 
Feature Description 
RNG 
Certified random number generator, certifications include   
AIS-31 [23], Common Criteria (CC) [24] or cryptographic 
algorithm validation program (CAVP) [25]  
ECDH Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellmann key exchange  
ECDSA Elliptic curve digital signature algorithm 
HMAC Key-Hash Message Authentication Code [26] 
Key Gen ECC key pair generated within the secure element 
Elliptic 
Curve 
Curves include NIST p-256, p-384 
SHA Secure hash algorithm [27] 
AES Hardware accelerated advanced encryption standard 
(D)TLS 
(Datagram) Transport layer security, supported cipher suites 
are:  
TLS_ECDH/E_ECDSA_WITH_AES128_CBC_SHA256 [28] 
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES128_CCM_8  
Memory Tamper proof memory, resistant against physical attacks 
Cert. 
handling  
Handling and storage of x509 certificates  
I2C Communication interface with speeds up to 1 Mbit/s 
I2C 
encrypt. 
Possibility to encrypt the I2C interface either with symmetric or 
asymmetric secrets 
Avg. 
Current 
The average current consumption lies between 3 – 10 mA. 
Sleep 
Current 
Sleep currents lie between 0 – 150 µA 
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